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Is Guantanamo Bay
Undermining the
Global War on Terror?
GERARD P. FOGARTY
“The basic proposition here is that somebody who comes into the United
States of America illegally, who conducts a terrorist operation killing
thousands of innocent Americans, men, women, and children, is not a
lawful combatant. They don’t deserve to be treated as a prisoner of war.
They don’t deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be used
for an American citizen going through the normal judicial process. . . .
[T]hey will have a fair trial, but it’ll be under the procedures of a military
tribunal. . . . We think [it] guarantees that we’ll have the kind of treatment
of these individuals that we believe they deserve.”
— Vice President Dick Cheney
1
14 November 2001

P

rosecution of the war against terror has resulted in the detention by the
United States of at least 650 citizens from more than 40 countries at military detention facilities on the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.2 Although the Bush Administration has held firm to the position expressed in the
above quotation by the Vice President almost four years ago, the legality of this
position continues to elicit significant worldwide commentary and, indeed,
the interest of the US Supreme Court.3 While the Administration’s position has
a number of prominent defenders,4 much international expert opinion has
weighed in on the other side of the debate. Some of this opinion has been particularly critical. Justice Richard Goldstone,5 for example, the former Chief Prosecutor in the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
stated in a BBC interview in late 2003 that “a future American President will
have to apologize for Guantanamo.”6 In the spring and early summer of 2005, a
number of US politicians—Republicans as well as Democrats—suggested that
perhaps the time had come to close the Guantanamo prison.
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The question of how to deal with the detainees in the ongoing Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT) is, however, an extremely difficult issue. The subject has not only generated worldwide commentary, but rifts within the Bush
Administration itself.7 Following 9/11, the Administration invoked extraordinary wartime powers to establish a new system of military justice that would
match a very different type of conflict. As the Administration sought to apply
those powers, it became mired in problems that it is still struggling to solve.
In this article, the competing positions on the legal status of the detainees are assessed. First, the article outlines why Guantanamo Bay was chosen as a location for detainee operations. It then outlines the competing
positions on the Prisoner of War (POW) status of the detainees and the competing views on the due process protections that should be provided detainees
charged with war crimes. The article then discusses the wider effects that the
Administration’s policies in Guantanamo Bay are having on the Global War
on Terrorism. The article concludes with recommendations for an alternative
approach to deal with the detainees. The recommended approach outlined in
this article aims to regain the initiative for the Bush Administration. It seeks
to recapture much-needed international legitimacy, thereby creating greater
diplomatic space within which opportunities to harness broader international
support and involvement in the Global War on Terrorism can be pursued.

Why Guantanamo Bay?
The United States and its coalition partners remain at war against al
Qaeda and its affiliates, both in Afghanistan and in further operations around
the world. Since Osama bin Laden declared war on the United States in 1996,
al Qaeda and its affiliates have launched repeated attacks that have killed
thousands of innocent Americans and hundreds of civilians from other countries.8 The Bush Administration states that the law of armed conflict governs
what it terms “the war between the US and al Qaeda” and therefore establishes the rules for detention of enemy combatants.9 The US Congress, however, has not formally declared war. Instead, the President has authorized the
detention, treatment, and trial of non-citizens in the Global War on Terrorism
under a “Military Order” derived from the constitutional authority vested in
his position as the President and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of
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the United States.10 In order to protect the nation and its citizens, and for the
effective conduct of military operations to prevent further terrorist attacks,
the Administration states that it is necessary to detain certain individuals to
prevent them from continuing to fight and, subsequently, to try those who violate the laws of war.11
A leaked classified report prepared by Defense Department lawyers
for Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 2003 appears to substantiate why Guantanamo Bay was preferred by the Administration as the location to detain individuals in the GWOT. The report cited the long-held view that Guantanamo
Bay offers the Administration certain legal “advantages” because its location
falls outside the jurisdiction of US courts.12 These advantages lie principally
in the areas of removing detainees’possible rights to question in US courts the
legality of their detention and to facilitate permissive interrogation techniques which would otherwise be constrained by US statutes. The leaked report was the outcome of a working group of executive branch lawyers
appointed by the General Counsel of the Department of Defense to address,
inter alia, the legal constraints on the interrogation of persons detained by the
United States.13
Some critics have linked the permissiveness of the legal interpretation for interrogation at Guantanamo, which underpinned Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld’s approval of 24 specific interrogation techniques there, including
“significantly increasing the fear level in a detainee,” to abuses that unfolded
late in 2003 at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.14 The Administration has denied
such a link even though the Defense Department’s investigation into Abu
Ghraib revealed that some of the techniques authorized for “unlawful combatants” in Guantanamo Bay had been used in Iraq.15 Seymour Hersh’s 2004
book, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, which attributes the Abu Ghraib abuse to the Administration’s interrogation policies in
Guantanamo, added fuel to the debate. Hersh’s theory about Guantanamo and
Abu Ghraib resonates with an increasingly critical domestic and international
audience, and lends credence to the claims of torture by the International
Committee of the Red Cross16 and by four former British detainees who have
sued Secretary Rumsfeld and ten others in the military chain of command for
mistreatment at Guantanamo.17
The Administration unsuccessfully argued before the US Supreme
Court in June 2004 its position that Guantanamo Bay lies outside the jurisdiction of US courts. The Supreme Court ruled that prisoners at Guantanamo
could challenge their detention by writ of habeas corpus in US federal court.18
The ruling means that foreign detainees have the right to use a US court to
question the legality of their imprisonment, even though they are being held
outside the country. This finding could be the basis for future rulings applica56
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ble to other US detention facilities as well. Many critics advocate that Guantanamo is the best-known detention facility, but that there are others operated
by the Administration in Afghanistan and elsewhere.19

Lawful or Unlawful Combatants?
Unlawful Combatants
The official US position is that the detainees do not meet the criteria
of legal combatants as outlined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and are
therefore “unlawful combatants” not entitled to POW status and other privileges specified by the Geneva Conventions.20 The detainees are not being
treated as common criminals to be tried in civil courts, as has previously been
the case with terrorists in the United States, because criminal law is too weak
a weapon.21 Instead, the detainees are being treated as members of a military
force, either al Qaeda or the Taliban, and as combatants in an armed conflict
against the United States. Secretary Rumsfeld has commented that “the detainees are not being labeled as prisoners of war because they did not engage
in warfare according to the precepts of the Geneva Convention—they hide
weapons, do not wear uniforms, and try to blur the line between combatant
and noncombatant.”22 One of Rumsfeld’s legal advisers, Ruth Wedgwood,
adds that the detainees are not covered by the Geneva Conventions because
they are not fighting for a state, and that there has never been a recognized
right to make war on the part of private groups.23
The Administration has not differentiated between al Qaeda or
Taliban detainees in its position that the detainees are unlawful combatants.
Additionally, it has advocated from as early as 2002 that no doubt exists as to
the status of each individual detainee.24 The Administration also advocates
that under the law of armed conflict the detainees can be held at Guantanamo
Bay until the conclusion of the war against terror25 and without the full-dress
procedure of criminal trials.26 Detainees, therefore, have been held in Guantanamo since January 2002 without charges,27 access to lawyers, or, until recently when the Supreme Court intervened, the right to challenge the legality
of their detention.
In June 2004 the Administration announced the release of 26 detainees after an internal legal review conducted by Pentagon lawyers in Guantanamo Bay determined that the individuals had been wrongly detained.28 The
timing of this announcement was unfortunate for the Administration since it
immediately preceded the Supreme Court hearing at which the Administration argued that detainee cases were being properly reviewed. Critics leaped
on this fact, suspecting the Administration was releasing some individuals
before the Supreme Court case in an attempt to demonstrate to the Court that
Autumn 2005
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it was reviewing the individual status of detainees.29 More recently, the Administration announced that it has continued reviewing the status of detainees
before an administrative tribunal.30 While the intent of the internal review
conducted early in 2004 may be debatable, the fact is that as a result of the
June 2004 Supreme Court ruling, the Administration is now reviewing the individual cases of all detainees.
The Bush Administration announced in September 2004 the format
for these reviews. The first is called a “Combatant Status Review Tribunal,”
which aims to determine whether each detainee meets the criteria of an enemy
combatant. The second is called a “Detainee Administrative Review,” which
is an annual review to determine the need to continue to detain the unlawful
combatant. Following this review a board will determine whether the detainee should be released, transferred, or continue to be detained.31 As of 2
November 2004, 295 Combatant Status Review Tribunals had been conducted. Only one detainee was determined not to be an enemy combatant and
was released.32 But once again, the Administration’s procedures attracted the
attention of the US courts. A Federal District Court Judge ruled on 8 November 2004 that the Administration must treat the detainees as POWs unless
they appear before a special tribunal described in Article 5 of the Third
Geneva Convention that determines they are not. The judge ruled that the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals do not satisfy the Geneva Convention
and are therefore insufficient to deny POW status.33
The Administration has stated that despite its determination that the
detainees are unlawful combatants, it has treated them humanely at all times
and provided privileges similar to those that POWs are entitled to under the
Geneva Conventions.34 The principal area of difference between how an “unlawful combatant” and a POW must be treated lies in more permissible interrogation methods and a reduced entitlement to various due process provisions.
POW status under the Geneva Conventions prohibits various methods of interrogation, many of which have been authorized by the Administration for use at
Guantanamo Bay, and demands a much higher level of due process protections
than that which the Administration has planned for detainees charged with war
crimes.35 POW status demands the same due process protections, for example,
that a US soldier would receive under a courts-martial proceeding.
The Opposing View
An article in The New York Times reported that in the days following
the President’s determination that the Geneva Conventions would not apply
to detainees in the GWOT, Colin Powell, then Secretary of State, supported
by Secretary Rumsfeld and also the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Richard Myers, asked the President to reconsider applying POW sta58
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tus to the Taliban fighters.36 Secretary Powell, and a wide range of critics, believed that since the Taliban fighters were members of the regular armed
forces of the de facto government of Afghanistan, they met the criteria for
POW status as outlined in the Geneva Conventions.37 Secretary Powell was
particularly concerned about the increased risk US troops would face in Afghanistan and future conflicts if the Administration failed to consider the
Geneva Conventions as applicable.38 Among other things, POW status would
entitle detainees to humane treatment during interrogation and different procedural and evidentiary rights39 to those which the Administration has established for its Military Commissions.40
Secretary Powell’s view about the POW status of the Taliban fighters is shared by many US and international experts,41 including subject specialists at the UN.42 These critics also argue that any al Qaeda detainees who
were acting as militia or volunteer corps members that formed part of the
Taliban armed forces are also entitled to POW status.43 Moreover, even if the
al Qaeda members do not qualify as members of the Taliban armed forces or
as members of its integral militia, they may still qualify for POW status under
the Geneva Conventions if they were part of an independent militia and meet
the criteria44 outlined in the Conventions.45 Regardless, as the critics point
out, the Geneva Conventions and US military regulations that precede 9/1146
require findings by a competent tribunal before detainees are deprived of
POW status.47 As discussed, tribunals are being convened by the Administration, but they have been ruled by a Federal District Court Judge as insufficient
to deny POW status.

Due Process Protections
Military Commissions
In the ongoing war against terror, the Bush Administration advocates that US civic ideals should not frustrate an effective defense.48 To overcome the limitations of US criminal law, for example, and in keeping with the
detainees’ status as unlawful combatants, the Administration has established
Military Commissions49 to try designated detainees.50 Military Commissions
are a type of US military tribunal last used in World War II for the trial of
spies, saboteurs, and war criminals. These commissions are applicable only
to non-US citizens and are designed to protect the individual rights of the accused while also safeguarding classified and sensitive information used as
evidence in the proceedings.51 The Administration outlines that the commissions are recognized by the Geneva Conventions and have been used by many
countries in the past.52 Egypt is among the countries that have used military
commissions, but when Egypt did use this form of tribunal in 2000 it was
Autumn 2005
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openly rebuked in the US State Department’s yearly report on human rights
abuses. The State Department report, which was presented to Congress,
averred that this type of military court deprived hundreds of civilian defendants of their constitutional rights.53
The Administration’s “forward-leaning” system of justice for detainees charged with war crimes was crafted by a small group of young lawyers who were settled into important posts in September 2001 at the White
House, the Justice Department, and other agencies. The work was conducted
under the direction of Vice President Cheney and coordinated by the White
House counsel at that time, Alberto Gonzales, who has since been elevated to
Attorney General. The work commenced little more than a week after 9/11.54
The idea of using Military Commissions had been investigated thoroughly a
decade before when options were being considered to try suspects in the
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.55 The interagency
group investigated four options: Military Commissions, criminal trials, military courts-martial, and tribunals with both civilian and military members,
like the Nuremberg trials.
By October 2001, the White House lawyers had grown impatient
with the “dithering” of the interagency group and took over the work themselves. It has been reported that at this stage all other options were abandoned
and planning for Military Commissions moved forward more quickly, but
with whole agencies, including the Defense Department, being left out of the
discussions completely.56 The legal basis for the Administration’s approach
was laid out on 6 November 2001 in a then-confidential memorandum sent to
Mr. Gonzales by the Attorney General’s office. Attorney General John Ashcroft subsequently refused congressional requests to provide a copy of the
document, but its contents were leaked and reported by The New York Times.
The memorandum said that the President, as Commander in Chief, has “inherent authority” to establish Military Commissions without congressional
authorization and that the Administration could apply international law selectively. In particular, the memorandum outlined the legal precedent under
which due process rights do not apply to Military Commissions.57
The Administration moved quickly after receiving the Attorney General’s advice, releasing the Presidential Military Order on “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism” a week
later, on 13 November 2001. Rear Admiral Don Guter, who was the Navy
Judge Advocate General at the time, has commented that many of the Pentagon’s experts on military justice were kept in the dark until the day before the
order was issued, and when it was issued the order included none of their hastily prepared amendments.58 It was also reported that senior staff from the National Security Council and the State Department were also excluded from the
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final discussions on the order, with the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of State finding out the details of the order only after it was issued.59
In World War II, when the US last used Military Commissions, the
tribunals were fashioned generally on the prevailing standard of military justice.60 Following 9/11, however, the Administration saw no reason why it
could not depart materially from current military justice standards and write
new law for the commissions. Those involved believed a paradigm shift was
needed to deal with terrorism. The presidential Military Order outlined the
concept for the revised approach, which enabled a lower standard of proof,
expanded secrecy provisions, permitted a more liberal application of the
death penalty, and denied judicial review of convictions.61 The order announced that the exact rules were to be established later by Secretary
Rumsfeld.62 Criticism of the order was immediate, but not all the criticism
came from outside the Administration. It is widely reported that the respective judge advocate generals within the Pentagon supported the use of commissions, but argued strongly that the system would not be fair without
amendment.63 In the end, when Secretary Rumsfeld published the rules for the
commissions, it became obvious that he had taken their counsel into consideration and had compromised. He granted defendants a presumption of innocence and set “beyond a reasonable doubt” as the standard for proving guilt,
but did not allow judicial review of convictions by civilian courts.64
On 3 July 2003, the Administration designated six detainees for the
first commissions.65 Two of the six were British. News of the men’s prosecution
became public in the United Kingdom just as British Prime Minister Tony Blair
was beginning a major public relations campaign to overcome his unpopular
support for the Iraq War. Under pressure from the British Parliament, Blair declared that any tribunals involving British citizens would follow “proper international law.”66 Blair was under increasing pressure from his Parliament to
secure custody of a total of nine British detainees at Guantanamo. A series of
negotiations involving the British Attorney General, Peter Goldsmith, and officials from the Bush Administration were initiated quickly in order to agree on
an acceptable process for the trial of the two British detainees. Lord Goldsmith
would not budge from a basic demand that civilian courts review verdicts from
the commissions.67 The Administration argued that such a change would render
the commissions unworkable. During a state visit to the UK in late November
2003, President Bush agreed to shelve the cases of the two British suspects for
the foreseeable future.68 It remains unclear how many detainees will ultimately
appear before a Military Commission, but the Administration has indicated
that most of the detainees will not face a commission and will simply be released when they no longer pose a threat—or will remain interned for the duration of the Global War on Terrorism.69
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The Opposing View
The Administration’s intent to try selected detainees by Military Commission has received widespread criticism. Spain, for example, has announced it
will not extradite terrorist suspects to the United States if they are to face the
tribunals.70 In essence, the opposing view characterizes the commissions as providing second-class justice. Amnesty International has been most vocal in its
criticism, but it has received extensive support from a wide range of scholars and
organizations.71 The critics argue the commissions are discriminatory because
they do not apply to US nationals, they allow a lower standard of evidence than is
admissible in ordinary courts, there is no right of appeal to an independent and
impartial court, and they lack independence from the executive branch.72 The
Army Lawyer, a US Department of the Army periodical, published an article in
November 2003 by a retired senior military lawyer that added weight to this
view. It noted that the commissions are a departure from long-standing military
practice, and they fail to provide the degree of fairness and due process expected
in trials conducted by the United States in the 21st century.73
The US Constitution is designed to provide a system of checks and
balances to prohibit, among other things, unfettered power by the executive
branch of government. The recent Supreme Court ruling on Guantanamo Bay
is a great example of the system working, with the judiciary deciding that the
executive does not have the authority to suspend the detainees’ habeas corpus
rights. Many believe the proposed commissions provide unfettered and unchallengeable power to the executive, which contravenes the most basic law
principles of independence and impartiality.74 Since the commissions began,
their most ardent critics have included the uniformed US lawyers assigned to
the defendants.75 These lawyers were successful in halting the first of the commissions, gaining a Federal District Court judge’s ruling on 9 November 2004
that curtailed the executive’s attempts to implement its “forward-leaning” system of justice. The ruling cast doubt on the future of the Military Commissions,
as the judge ruled that President Bush had both overstepped his constitutional
bounds and improperly brushed aside the Geneva Conventions in establishing
Military Commissions.76 The Administration has successfully appealed this
decision, but at this writing the prospect of a counter-appeal remains.77

The Consequences of the Administration’s Actions
For the past three years, the Administration has focused publicly on
the operational benefits that detainee operations on Guantanamo Bay have
generated. It also has downplayed the cascading problems the operations
have faced: angry foreign allies, a tarnishing of America’s image, and declining cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism.
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Operational Benefits
The Administration believes that the interrogation of the detainees
has improved the security of the United States and coalition partners by expanding their understanding of al Qaeda and its affiliates. This information is
critical to disrupt the attack plans of al Qaeda and its affiliates throughout the
world. Interrogation has revealed al Qaeda leadership structures, operatives,
funding mechanisms, communication methods, training and selection programs, travel patterns, support infrastructures, and plans for attacking the
United States and other nations.78 The Administration states that Guantanamo
detainees have provided the United States with priceless intelligence: information on individuals connected to al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction; information on front companies and accounts supporting al
Qaeda; information on surface-to-air missiles, improvised explosive devices,
and al Qaeda tactics and training; and detailed information on travel routes potentially used by terrorists to reach the United States via South America.79
Detention of enemy combatants during conflict is not an act of punishment; it is a matter of security and military necessity. The information being obtained from the detainees is clearly helping in the GWOT. It is enabling
the United States and its coalition partners to be more effective in the planning and conduct of counterterrorist missions. It also is assisting in the development of countermeasures to disrupt terrorist activities and focusing
information collection on al Qaeda financing and network operatives. Perhaps the greatest operational benefit from interrogating Guantanamo detainees, however, lies in the expanded understanding the United States now
possesses of jihadist motivation, selection, and training processes.80 This information is essential to identifying the root causes of terrorism, which is arguably the key to winning the Global War on Terrorism. The issue for the
Administration is whether these benefits are worth the costs that the detainee
operations have also generated.
Undermining US Influence and Effectiveness
In March 2004, the Pew Research Center reported that US prestige in
the world community had shown a steady decline, and this report was published before the Abu Ghraib incidents were revealed.81 The Pew findings were
supported by other international opinion surveys.82 The US Council on Foreign
Relations found in 2003 that one of the things the Bush Administration needs to
do to reduce this rising anti-Americanism is to “improve its capacity to listen to
foreign publics.”83 Clearly, the international community, and individual rights
groups and academics within the United States, believe that the Administration
is ignoring international law in its treatment of the detainees. One Colombian
columnist has referred to Guantanamo as the US “Gulag.”84
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“Detention of enemy combatants during conflict
is not an act of punishment; it is a matter
of security and military necessity.”

The Military Commissions empowered under President Bush’s military order are the exact types of trials that the United States openly condemns
in the international community.85 In today’s media environment, inconsistencies such as this are highlighted, evaluated, and then broadcast repeatedly to
every corner of the globe. The effect of this apparent double standard is to
deny the United States the moral high ground it needs to censure other nations
in the future for human rights abuses. Such double standards potentially place
the Administration at odds with the values of the American people, thereby
creating a fault line that if pressured in the future may degrade the domestic
support base for what is going to be a generation-long Global War on Terrorism. General John Gordon, a retired Air Force general and former CIA director who served as both the senior counterterrorism official and homeland
security adviser on President Bush’s National Security Council, best described this dilemma with the comment, “There was great concern that we
were setting up a process that was contrary to our own ideals.”86
The worldwide promotion of human rights is clearly in keeping with
America’s most deeply held values.87 Colin Powell has said that “respect for
human rights is essential to lasting peace and sustained economic growth,
goals which Americans share with people all over the world.”88 At the Human
Rights Defenders of the Frontlines of Freedom Conference at the Carter Center
in November 2003, former President Jimmy Carter was disturbed to find that
many participants believed the United States is contributing directly to an erosion of human rights by its current policies with respect to the Guantanamo detainees. Moreover, President Carter deplored the indefinite detention of the
suspects at Guantanamo and added, “I say this because this is a violation of the
basic character of my country and it’s very disturbing to me.”89 The attacks
against the United States on 9/11 were horrific, and it is in the interest of all civilized nations that the perpetrators be tried and punished, but long-held US values on human rights must outweigh the nation’s desire for retribution. As
General John Shalikashvili, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has
so accurately stated, “The US has repeatedly faced foes in its past that, at the
time they emerged, posed threats of a nature unlike any that it had previously
faced, but the US has been far more steadfast in the past in keeping faith with its
64
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national commitment to the rule of law.”90 To do otherwise only adds to the
growing worldwide anti-Americanism that undermines US credibility and,
therefore, US influence and effectiveness.
Undermining the Coalition
The US strategy for winning the Global War on Terrorism is predicated on creating an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and
all those who support them.91 There is a realization that in this war, the United
States does not have the option of going it alone. President Bush has stated
that the United States will “constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community in this fight against a common foe,”92 because success
“will not come by always acting alone, but through a powerful coalition of nations maintaining a strong, united international front against terrorism.”93 A
senior official in US Central Command, the regional combatant command responsible for prosecuting both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, has stated that America’s Achilles’ heel in these operations
is coalition support. US Central Command sees shaping domestic opinion
worldwide as essential to maintaining a strong coalition.94
In Southeast Asia, an area described by the Asia Pacific Centre for
Strategic Studies as a primary fault line in the GWOT, there are serious issues
that limit greater cooperation with the United States. The divide between
anti-Americanism among citizens and their largely pro-US governments is an
issue that places serious limits on the abilities of governments to participate
further in the GWOT. Democratically elected leaders must be responsive to
their constituents, and many constituents in Southeast Asia remain skeptical
about the GWOT, as these nations are faced with more pressing issues that affect their day-to-day well-being.
The US Administration therefore faces significant challenges in creating a shared understanding of the terrorist threat and in its essential task of extending cooperation in international counterterrorism efforts. The treatment of
detainees at Guantanamo significantly affects the Administration’s ability to
undertake this task. General Shalikashvili, and many others, have stated that
Guantanamo operations have fostered greater animosity toward the United
States and undermined its efforts in the Global War on Terrorism.95 Many nations view Guantanamo Bay as the principal example of how the GWOT is to
be fought, and people from those nations do not like seeing images of shackled
detainees in orange jumpsuits or reading about allegations of abuse and violations of international law. Even governments from nations who are stalwart
supporters of the Global War on Terrorism are under siege from their populations. In Australia and the United Kingdom, for example, the governments are
under increasing pressure to withdraw from the coalition because large segAutumn 2005
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ments of their populations view America’s treatment of Australian and British
detainees as violating the very principles that the Coalition of the Willing aims
to uphold. Whether the 7 July terrorist bombings in London will affect those
views—and in which direction—at this writing remains to be seen.

A Modified Means
The reviews of individual cases that the Administration is conducting in the wake of the June 2004 Supreme Court ruling have now been ruled as
insufficient and must be modified in order to determine the POW status of the
detainees.96 The United States cannot proceed with its Military Commissions
without first modifying its Combatant Status Review Tribunals. Should a
modified tribunal determine in due course that POW status is warranted, then,
as already discussed, the Geneva Conventions demand higher levels of due
process for POWs than that which is embedded into the Military Commissions. Given the Bush Administration’s views on the POW issue, the more
likely outcome is that a modified tribunal will determine formally in due
course that POW status should be denied and Military Commissions should
follow. It appears clear, however, that the outcomes of any Military Commissions will not be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of a world already deeply
skeptical of the detentions on Guantanamo. The United States can preserve
the moral high ground by revisiting the initial interagency group’s options
and moving the trials into the international arena.
As discussed previously, the initial interagency group investigated
four options: Military Commissions, criminal trials, military courts-martial,
and tribunals with both civilian and military members. Criminal courts would
provide insufficient latitude without Congress toughening criminal laws and
adapting the courts.97 This may have been an option in early 2002 when it was
advocated by the Justice Department, but it is now too late given the fact that
the detainees have been in custody for three years.98 The court-martial option
offers some advantages. Foremost, it would safeguard the Administration
against potential domestic or international legal challenges attacking the trial
process itself.99 A court-martial would meet all current standards of fundamental rights under the customary and written rules of law.100 A court-martial
also would offer the Administration the distinct advantage of protecting any
sensitive and classified material during the proceedings. The significant disadvantage to a court-martial, however, is that because the Administration has
for the past two years created an atmosphere of legal ambiguity, the international community is conditioned to being skeptical and is therefore likely to
be suspicious of any outcomes from a US military proceeding.
This leaves the final option of tribunals. The United Nations has established in the past, on an ad hoc basis, tribunals to deal with individual re66
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sponsibility for war crimes.101 These tribunals have been empowered by the
UN to deal with specific crimes during defined time periods.102 Relinquishing
control of the trials to the UN is not without risk, however, and may in the end
prove politically untenable for any US administration. A more politically acceptable option would be to seek a UN-authorized US tribunal, similar to the
special courts established in 2000 to try war criminals in Sierra Leone103 and
East Timor.104 In these instances the respective governments and the UN set
up these courts jointly. The tribunals were mandated to try those charged with
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The courts were international bodies, but staffed
principally from within the respective countries.
In the current instance, the tribunal would be established under special statute, agreed by the United States and the UN. The statute could include
the requirement for a balance of civilian and military, and US and international,
judges and prosecutors. The significant advantages of this model, as opposed
to the UN ad hoc tribunals, is that the United States would have greater control,
and it would bring into the proceedings the values of US judges and prosecutors. Such action would be viewed as a legitimate form of justice in the international community and would therefore assist ongoing US efforts in the Global
War on Terrorism. It also would send an important message to the international
community about US beliefs on collective legitimization versus unilateralism,
most notably that the United States believes that the UN and the Security Council have not become irrelevant and still have a major role to play in international relations.105 It also would do much to negate the pressure many coalition
governments are facing from increasingly skeptical domestic populations.
The greatest benefit for the United States, however, lies in the area of recapturing much-needed legitimacy, and consequently reducing widespread antiAmericanism. International legitimacy will generate greater diplomatic space
for the Administration, providing opportunities to harness the broader international cooperation it needs to win the Global War on Terrorism.

Conclusion
In the prosecution of the war against terror, the Bush Administration
has sought to redefine the borders between civil liberties and public safety. The
official position of the Administration remains that the detainees at Guantanamo are unlawful combatants and not POWs, but that they are being treated
in accordance with the law. The unlawful combatant status and the due process
protections arbitrarily given by the Administration to the 650 foreign nationals
detained at Guantanamo Bay have attracted significant domestic and international criticism. Many in the international community, and among individual
rights groups and academics within the United States, believe that the AdminAutumn 2005
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istration is ignoring international law in its treatment of the detainees. These
critics present a strong argument that the United States is, in fact, breaking the
law. The US Supreme Court and, more recently, a Federal District Court have
weighed into the debate with rulings that curtail significantly the executive’s
attempts to suspend select human rights in its response to 9/11.
In addition to undermining the rule of law, there have been other
harmful unintended consequences of the Administration’s policy in Guantanamo Bay: providing fuel to a rising global anti-Americanism that weakens
US influence and effectiveness, degrading the Administration’s domestic support base, and denying the United States the moral high ground it needs to promote international human rights in the future. It seems clear that these costs
have far outweighed the operational benefits that the detainee operations have
generated. Consequently the Administration should now adjust its approach.
The United States can preserve the moral high ground by adjusting its Combatant Status Review Tribunals to determine adequately the POW status of the detainees. It should then move the detainees’ trials into the international arena.
This adjustment would be viewed as ensuring a legitimate form of justice in the
international community and would do much to reduce the anti-Americanism
that is potentially undermining the coalition in the Global War on Terrorism.
Such action is needed not just because it is the right thing to do, but because it is
in the long-term interests of the United States and the world community to do
so. In seeking to redefine the borders between civil liberties and public safety,
the Bush Administration might profitably look for guidance to Benjamin
Franklin, who said more than two centuries ago in another difficult time, “They
that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”106
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